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Abstract We explore the innovation performance bene-
fits of alliances for spin-off firms, in particular spin-offs
either from other firms or from public research organiza-
tions. During the early years of the emerging combinato-
rial chemistry industry, the industry on which our empir-
ical analysis focuses, spin-offs engaged in alliances with
large and established partners, partners of similar type
and size, and with public research organizations, often for
different reasons. We seek to understand to what extent
alliances of spin-offs with other firms (either large- or
small- and medium-sized firms) affected their innovation
performance and also how this performance may have
been affected by their corporate or public research back-
ground. We find evidence that in general alliances of
spin-offs with other firms, in particular alliances with
large firms, increased their innovation performance. Cor-
porate spin-offs that formed alliances with other firms
outperformed public research spin-offs with such alli-
ances. This suggests that, in terms of their innovation
performance, corporate spin-offs that engaged in alliances
with other firms seemed to have benefitted from their
prior corporate background. Interestingly, it turns out that
the negative impact of alliances on the innovation perfor-
mance of public research spin-offs was largely affected
by their alliances with small- and medium-sized firms.
Keywords Alliances . Spin-offs .Entrepreneurial firms .
Innovation performance
JEL classification L24 . L26 . L65 .M13 . O32
1 Introduction
Over the last two decades, globalization and increased
competition have reshaped the innovation strategies of
many firms towards a greater focus on external sources
of knowledge (e.g., Archibugi and Michie 1995; OECD
2007). Internal sources of technological development
alone are often insufficient to cope with the increasing
intensity of competition and with the complexity and
uncertainty of modern technologies. The alliance litera-
ture has well established that firms in technology-
intensive industries are increasingly involved in various
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collaborations with heterogeneous partners, recognizing
the crucial role of inter-firm networks and alliance port-
folios in determining firms’ innovation performance
(e.g., George et al. 2001; Powell and Grodal 2005).
Despite the wide recognition of alliances as a major
vehicle for knowledge transfer and access to other firms’
knowledge-based resources and capabilities (see also
Mowery et al. 1996; Hagedoorn 1993), surprisingly,
prior research gave limited attention to whether and
how participation in inter-firm networks and formation
of alliances affect the innovation performance of spin-
offs, as a specific group of firms.
Notwithstanding this apparent omission, spin-off
firms are worthwhile to study for several reasons. First,
these firms are quite distinct from other (traditional)
technological start-up firms in that they often have pref-
erential access to valuable and difficult to imitate re-
sources (Dahl and Sorenson 2014) and are more closely
connected to their environment compared to other more
loosely linked start-ups (Sedaitis 1998). Second, a sub-
stantial increase in the number of new firms as a result of
spin-offs from existing firms and public research organi-
zations, in particular in such sectors as biotechnology and
information technology (Spin-Off Advisors 2014), leads
to a substantial academic and policy interest in these
firms. Consequently, an important stream of literature
has emerged since the early work by Cooper (1971)
and Garvin (1983) that documents important positive
contributions of spin-offs to economic value and growth.
In this paper, we contribute to the entrepreneurship
literature on spin-offs by examining two related ques-
tions, i.e., Bwhy^ and Bwith whom^ (with which cate-
gories of firms) participation in inter-firm alliance net-
works benefits the innovation performance of spin-off
firms. In answering these two questions, we take a
portfolio approach—a collection of all alliance links
maintained by a focal firm—that serves as a vehicle
for accessing and recombining knowledge to increase
(innovation) performance (Wassmer 2010). The poten-
tial benefits (the why question) of engaging in alliances
derive from the notion that spin-offs in the combinato-
rial chemistry and biopharmaceutical industries operate
in an environment characterized by strong technology
and market uncertainties (Malo 2009; Santoro and
McGill 2005). In addition, few, if any, spin-offs initially
possess the comprehensive range of technological capa-
bilities needed to stay innovative across a broad set of
products and services (Forrest 1990). Consequently,
forming alliances with other firms holds a promise for
knowledge cross-fertilization and cumulative learning
and facilitates spin-off firms to become more efficient
in their technology development activities (Clarysse
et al. 2000; Lechner et al. 2006; Lockett et al. 2005).
Given the specific nature of these firms, as young and
technology-intensive but often lacking business acu-
men, we subsequently examine with whom (i.e., large
incumbent or similar-sized partners) the realization of
the upside potential of alliances is most viable. We
expect that the answer to this question partly depends
on the formative nature of a spin-off itself. In addition to
alternative alliance partner settings, we, therefore, also
consider two major categories of spin-offs with very
different backgrounds: corporate spin-offs (CSOs),
firms that were spun-off (divested) by other firms, pub-
lic research spin-offs (PROs), and firms that were spun-
off (divested) by universities or public research organi-
zations (Shane 2004; Helm and Mauroner 2007;
Klepper 2009 for an overview). Prior research reveals
significant differences between these two types of spin-
off firms in such aspects as superior employment and
sales growth of CSOs compared to PROs (e.g.,
Stankiewicz 1994; Callan 2001; Ensley and Hmieleski
2005; Yagüe-Perales and March-Chordà 2012; Zhang
2009). On the other hand, not much is known about the
similarities or differences in the networking strategies of
CSOs and PROs and how the underlying alliance
choices made by these young, technology-intensive
firms can help explain subsequent innovation perfor-
mance differences between PROs and CSOs (cf.,
Lindholm-Dahlstrand 1997; Löfsten and Lindelöf
2005).
In addressing our research questions, we draw on a
knowledge conversion capability perspective (Boeker
1989; Zahra et al. 2007) and integrate insights from
two equally influent and informative schools of thought
in the alliance literature that points at either the positive
or the negative effects of asymmetric alliances involving
young, relatively unestablished entrants and resource-
abundant, large incumbent firms.
We test hypotheses in a unique, historical, empirical
setting—a panel of 135 publicly traded spin-offs in the
nascent field of combinatorial chemistry (i.e., an auto-
mated synthesis method capable of creating dozens, if
not hundreds and thousands, of different molecules
simultaneously for the purpose of discovering drugs,
new materials, pesticides, etc.) during the years 1990–
2003. As such, our research covers the crucial period of
the emergence and gradual maturing of that industry
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(Thomke and Kuemmerle 2002), a period also charac-
terized by high growth and increasing alliance activity
of relevant spin-offs.
Our study contributes to the entrepreneurship spin-
off literature by highlighting why and when alliances
matter for innovation performance of two very different
categories of spin-offs, CSOs and PROs. This is a novel
perspective, as prior studies have given only limited
attention to the network strategies of spin-offs1 and up
till now primarily focused on the issues of survival,
growth, and profitability of this type of new firms,
overlooking the innovation dimension. Our analysis of
networking strategies of spin-offs confirms that the con-
sequences of the choice of alliances partner for a spin-
off’s innovation performance differ importantly depend-
ing on its background (i.e., corporate as opposed to
university or public research).
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the
following section, we develop a small set of hypotheses
that guide our research on the different effects of alli-
ances of spin-offs with either large- or small- and
medium-sized partners and the expected different out-
comes of alliances for CSOs and PROs. This is followed
by a section in which we picture the industrial setting for
our empirical research and outline our data, sample, and
measures. Next, we present some descriptive statistics
and we test our hypotheses and some additional related
research questions by means of instrumental variable
Poisson models, a supplementary analysis, and some
robustness checks. In the final section, we discuss our
findings in light of the alliance and spin-off literatures
and we outline some of the limitations of our research
and possible topics for future research.
2 Theoretical background and hypotheses
The vast literature on alliances appears unanimous in
emphasizing the importance of alliances for a range of
firms that operate in high-tech industries (Ahuja 2000;
Carayannis et al. 2000; Lavie 2007; Rothaermel and
Deeds 2004; Soh 2003). The biopharmaceutical indus-
try is a prime example of a high-tech industry where in
particular, new firms, such as spin-offs, play an impor-
tant role in inter-firm networks based on alliances
(Roijakkers and Hagedoorn 2006; Ernst and Young
2011). The continuing appeal of alliances in these in-
dustries may be understood from a number of perspec-
tives, including achieving improved economies of scale
and scope (Gomes-Casseres 1997), further specializa-
tion in newly discovered technology fields (Zidorn and
Wagner 2013), obtaining external legitimation (Baum
and Oliver 1991) and gaining access to tangible and
intangible (complementarity) assets (Rothaermel 2001;
Lerner and Merges 1998).
A more specific explanation resides in the observa-
tion that spin-offs that operate in pharmaceutical and
biotechnology industries face an environment character-
ized by strong technology and market uncertainties
(Santoro and McGill 2005; Senker and Sharp 1997),
where many new chemical entities and proteins/
peptides are developed but few are actually chosen.
Recent data put the clinical success rate of pharmaceu-
ticals and biopharmaceuticals at 13 and 32%, respec-
tively (DiMasi et al. 2010, see also Bienz-Tadmor et al.
1992, for earlier data). Even so, only about 30% of the
products that reach the marketplace eventually generate
enough revenues to repay their R&D costs (DiMasi and
Grabowski 2012). Given this uncertain future, the for-
mation of alliances may be seen as an important way for
spin-offs and other new technology-based firms to
hedge their R&D investments (Mowery 1989;
Hagedoorn 1993).
In addition, few, if any, spin-offs initially possess the
broad range of technological capabilities needed to stay
innovative across a broad set of products and services
(Forrest 1990). Insofar as innovations are the lifeblood
of high-tech industries, allowing firms to grow and
increase market share and, ultimately, profits (Cooper
2001), it is not surprising that the lack of information on
new technologies is regarded as one of the most critical
internal obstacles to innovation (Galia and Legros 2004;
de Leeuw et al. 2013). New firms such as spin-offs are
therefore often prompted into inter-firm alliances by the
need to gain access to other firms’ knowledge-based
resources (Alvarez and Barney 2001; Scholten et al.
2015). With the growth in the number of alliances, the
locus of innovation for firms, including spin-offs, is no
longer located within a single firm but rather in the
network of alliances in which that firm is located
(Freeman 1991; Powell et al. 1996). A number of stud-
ies demonstrate that the participation of young, start-up
firms in alliances is indeed positively associated with a
range of innovation indicators (Baum et al. 2000; Chen
1 A partial exception is Löfsten and Lindelöf (2005) who do not
distinguish between different types of partners. We thank an anony-
mous referee for pointing out the latter study.
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and Li 1999; Dowling and Helm 2006; Freel and
Harrison 2006; Haeussler et al. 2012; George et al.
2001; Neyens et al. 2010; Shan et al. 1994; Stuart 2000).
While in general we expect spin-offs, as a distinct
type of a young, start-up firm, to benefit in terms of
increased innovation from their alliances with other
firms, they might benefit differently, depending on
whether they form alliances with rather dissimilar part-
ners, i.e., with either large, well-established, firms or
with other small- and medium-sized firms (SMEs). In
the literature, we see two opposed and well-supported
views on the benefits for spin-offs and other small firms
in forming alliances either with large firms or with
SMEs.
One body of literature suggests that forming alliances
with large incumbent firms fortifies spin-offs’ reputation
in terms of the perceived quality of their technology. In
addition, research also suggests that, compared to less
prominent or small partners, there is higher willingness
of large, incumbent partners to invest in alliances (Baum
et al. 2000; Stuart 2000; Dacin et al. 2007; Rao et al.
2008; Walter et al. 2006). Most importantly, the en-
dorsement of a technology’s intrinsic value by large
established firms has the potential of attracting other
high-quality partners, which, in turn, can increase the
access of a new technology-based firm, such as a spin-
off, to critical resources and, in so doing, positively
influence its innovation performance (Dacin et al.
2007). Stuart (2000), in his study on new technology-
based firms in the semiconductor industry, reports that
alliances with well-known and larger firms play a sig-
nificant role in building confidence in the value of
young and small firms’ product and services, thereby
facilitating their endeavors to attract other corporate
partners and, ultimately, innovate. In another example,
Baum et al. (2000) show that dedicated biotechnology
firms, such as biotech spin-offs, that form alliances with
prominent pharmaceutical firms displayed better rates of
patenting activity than those forming alliances with
other small biotech firms. In line with the latter study,
Haeussler et al. (2012) found that the alliances of new
biotech firms with other new small firms offer few if any
opportunities for new product development, although
the effect of these alliances on innovation performance
is somewhat mitigated by the degree to which the new
firm has specialized technological capabilities. In sum,
this particular perspective on alliances between small
firms, such as spin-offs, and either large firms or SMEs
suggests the following hypothesis:
H1a. In terms of their innovation performance,
spin-off firms benefit more from alliances with
large firms than from alliances with small- and
medium-sized firms.
Interestingly, there is also an opposing view that
highlights risks that small firms, such as spin-offs, face
in partnering with large firms and that describes these
alliances in terms of metaphors such as Bdancing with
elephants^ (Perez et al. 2012), Bdancing with gorillas^
(Prashantham and Birkinshaw 2008), and Bswimming
with sharks^ (Katila et al. 2008). Alvarez and Barney
(2001) estimate that the probability that a small firm-
large firm alliance will be unsuccessful may be even as
high as 80%, with many of the small firms involved
having to declare bankruptcy following the alliance
failure. Rosenbuch et al. (2010), who conducted a
meta-analysis to review 42 empirical studies, suggest
that the internal innovation development projects of
small firms are more productive than those projects that
involve alliances with larger firms. Similarly, a longi-
tudinal study of alliances in the US motion picture
industry carried out by Vandaie and Zaheer (2014)
indicates that large partners diminish the positive
effect of internal capability on the growth of small,
independent studios.
The literature suggests a range of explanations as to
why alliances with large established partners do not
always meet the expectations of new technology-based
firms such as spin-offs. Some studies state that conver-
gence of purpose stemming from cultural distance and
technological uncertainty stand in the way of successful
asymmetric alliances between firms of very different
size (Doz 1988; Tripsas et al. 1995). Others cite the
poor communication between two very different
Bspecies^: whereas larger firms feature multiple
Blayers^ in their organizational structure and explicit
processes for every task, small and newly established
firms comprise generalists who mostly use informal
processes for getting things done (Botkin and
Matthews 1992; Kelly et al. 2000; Prashantham and
Birkinshaw 2008).
This understanding of asymmetric alliances boils
down to the basic idea that large firms might often
leverage their bargaining power and extract a dispropor-
tional share of the benefits (Khanna et al. 1998; Bessy
and Brousseau 1998; Kishida 2002; Lavie 2007). No-
where is this more evident than in exploratory alliances,
motivated by the desire to discover new opportunities
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(Koza and Lewin 1999), where firms face constant
value allocation renegotiations about intellectual prop-
erty rights and innovation benefits of newly discovered
technologies that were impossible to foresee at the out-
set (Rothaermel and Deeds 2004; Yang et al. 2014). In
that context, new firms, such as spin-offs, which often
lack the experience associated with managing alliances,
are disadvantaged vis-à-vis their large alliance partners
(Rosenbusch et al. 2011; Yang et al. 2014). Obviously,
these disadvantages are less decisive in alliances
of spin-offs with SMEs where both partners face a
more similar level playing field. As such, this
rather different perspective suggests the following
alternative hypothesis:
H1b. In terms of their innovation performance,
spin-off firms benefit more from alliances with
small and medium-sized firms than from alliances
with large firms.
So far, we discussed spin-offs and the innovation
performance implications of their alliances in terms of
different alliance partner’s size categories. However, the
literature on spin-offs suggests that there are also some
major differences between CSOs and PROs, as CSOs
seem to economically outperform PROs (Stankiewicz
1994; Lindholm-Dahlstrand 1997; Callan 2001; Tübke
2005; Ensley and Hmieleski 2005; Mustar et al. 2008;
Yagüe-Perales and March-Chordà 2012; Zhang 2009;
Wennberg et al. 2011). This advantage of CSOs over
PROs begs the question as to what factors cause these
advantages and to what extent they impact the innova-
tion performance implications of the alliances in which
these different categories of spin-offs engage. From a
general perspective, the answer to this question can be
related to the imprinting argument set forward by
Stinchcombe (1965): organizations carry the legacy of
their founding conditions. In the context of spin-offs, the
argument is as follows: CSOs outperform non-CSOs,
such as PROs, because their founding team members
exhibit different Bgenetic^ characteristics in the form of
prior business experience (Dahl and Reichstein 2007;
Zahra et al. 2007; Andersson and Klepper 2013). In
other words, spin-offs do not start their existence with
clean slates; instead, they inherit the congenital knowl-
edge of their entrepreneurial founders (Boeker 1989;
Unger et al. 2011). PROs are less successful, with fewer
prospects for growth and survival than CSOs, because
their founders often lack the social capital required to
secure external financing (Hirai et al. 2013; Shane and
Stuart 2002) as well as the business acumen necessary to
bring new products to markets (Lindholm-Dahlstrand
1997). According to Colombo and Piva (2012), foun-
ders of PROs seldom held previous managerial posi-
tions in other firms. These authors also find that aca-
demic founders that lack managerial experience are less
likely than their peers from other spin-offs to make
adequate commercial investments. In addition, van
Geenhuizen and Soetanto (2009) reveal that another
important obstacle to growth facing PROs, such as
academic spin-offs, is their lack of marketing
knowledge.
Agarwal et al. (2004) underscore the crucial role
played by parental knowledge in linking the greater
success of CSOs, compared to PROs, to better initial
technological and market pioneering capabilities of their
founders. Extending the imprinting argument, Zahra
et al. (2007) suggest that the superior performance of
CSOs, compared to that of PROs, is also related to their
founders’ abilities to maintain and continue using a
range of business relationships. Not only the connec-
tions and networks of alliances that the founders of a
CSOs inherit at inception of new ventures significantly
enhance the ability of CSOs to transform knowledge
into valuable products. Recent entrepreneurship re-
search found that the ability of effective strategy formu-
lation will vary by founder’s identity and prior experi-
ence (Fauchart and Gruber 2011; Casper and Storz
2015). Careful identification of the Bright^ alliance part-
ners is not a trivial task and is considered as one of the
keys for successful alliance strategy by new ventures
(Greve et al. 2014; Walter et al. 2006). Given these
findings, we expect that the corporate or academic
backgrounds of the founders of CSOs or PROs
have an enduring impact on the strategic choices
of new firms such as the choice of particular
alliance partners.
In sum, given that the CSO founders’ contacts and
previous networks are more varied, business-related,
and valuable compared to those of PROs, compounded
with superior technological, market pioneering and net-
work strategy-formulation capabilities of CSOs, we ex-
pect that, compared to PROs, CSOs are better able to
benefit from their inter-firm alliances. Hence:
H2. In terms of their innovation performance, cor-
porate spin-offs benefit more from alliances with
other firms than public research spin-offs.
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3 Methods
3.1 Industry setting
The industry setting for our study is found in the field of
combinatorial chemistry, for which the period that we
study in the context of alliance formation (1990–2003)
marks the crucial shift from its very early emerging state
to a first stage of some maturity (Thomke and
Kuemmerle 2002). It is important to note that over time,
the term Bcombinatorial chemistry^ has taken different
meanings, leading to some degrees of misunderstanding
and even confusion (Lebl 2002). For some, it refers solely
to the split-mix method, arguably the first combinatorial
synthesis technology developed by Arkad Furka at
Eötvös University in Budapest in 1982. For others, in-
cluding the International Union of Pure and Applied
Chemistry (IUPAC), the term denotes any process used
B … to prepare large sets of organic compounds by
combining sets of building blocks …^ (Maclean et al.
1999, p. 2351). This broader definition encompasses
more than a dozen techniques, ranging from parallel
synthesis to click chemistry, and it reflects the industry
and technology setting that is subject to our study.
Virtually, all process innovations related to combina-
torial chemistry originated in academic laboratories and
other PROs, including the Central Veterinary Institute in
the Netherlands (parallel synthesis), University of Cam-
bridge (diversity-oriented synthesis), Torrey Pines Insti-
tute for Molecular Studies (the Btea-bag^ procedure), the
German National Research Center for Biotechnology
(SPOT synthesis), and Scripps Research Institute (click
chemistry). Over time, university researchers, profes-
sors, and other public sector researchers coming from
the chemistry discipline jumped on the combinatorial
bandwagon, launching spin-offs in the USA (e.g., Rich-
ard Houghton at the Torrey Pines Institute for Molecular
Studies formed Houghton Pharmaceuticals), Great Brit-
ain (e.g., Steve Davies fromOxford University launched
Oxford Asymmetry), France (e.g., Thierry Jean resigned
from the CNRS to establish Cerep), and Denmark (e.g.,
Glenn Tong from the Technical University of Denmark
co-founded AudA Pharmaceuticals).
However, the industry is not exclusively populated by
PROs. Established in 1988, Affymax and Coselco
Mimotopes were the first two new technology-based
firms set up to engage in combinatorial chemistry re-
search. Palo-Alto-based independent start-up Affymax
was the brainchild of Alejandro Zaffaroni—the
quintessential Schumpeterian entrepreneur, legendary
for having launched several successful firms (notably
Syntex, Alza, and DNAX). Coselco Mimotope was
established as a CSO from Commonwealth Serum Lab-
oratories, Australia’s largest biotech firm. This later case
was not unique. Many other firms have also spun off
start-ups with a competence in combinatorial chemistry,
e.g., GlaxoSmithKline spun out NiKem Research; Hoff-
man LaRoche, Basilea Pharmaceuticals; Scios, Guilford
Pharmaceuticals; and Affymax, Affymetrix, and
Maxygen. In addition, manufacturers of scientific instru-
mentation (e.g., Advanced ChemTech), computational
chemistry suppliers (e.g., Tripos), and, most commonly,
biotechnology firms (e.g., Oxford Glycosciences, Vertex
Pharmaceuticals) that were seeking to diversify their
technology portfolios also entered into this field.
3.2 Data and sample
We test our hypotheses on a longitudinal data set com-
posed of 135 spin-offs operating in the combinatorial
chemistry industry. Technology class information was
used to make an initial identification of spin-offs with a
clear competence in combinatorial chemistry. Each firm
had to be endowed with at least one BClass 506^ patent
(which is a special subclass created by the US Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) for inventions in the do-
main of combinatorial chemistry technology) or have a
scientific publication in that field.2 We then applied the
following three criteria to the initial selection: the firm
had to be (1) publicly traded so as to allow the collection
of R&D expenditures data, (2) established as either a
PRO or a CSO, and (3) commercially active between
1990 and 2003. Following Thomke and Kuemmerle
(2002), this time frame represents a particularly inter-
esting period to examine as it largely captures the rapid
emergence of combinatorial chemistry and its most dy-
namic phase of industrial technological development.
Reviewing the spin-off literature, we found no unifying
consensus of a practical definition of either PROs or CSOs
(Iacobucci et al. 2011). In order to remove the ambiguity
involved with identifying different types of spin-offs, we
adopted the OECD definition of PRO. Accordingly, the
term is defined as any new firm (1) of which the key
technology is licensed from a university or another PRO,
2 For an examination of the process of creating a new patent category
for combinatorial chemistry within the International Patent Classifica-
tion (IPC), see Kang (2012).
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(2) which includes a university or public sector employee
as a founder, and/or (3) in which a PRO has made an
equity investment (Callan 2001). A CSO, by contrast,
refers to any independent entity founded on the basis of
a technology and human capital originating from a parent
firm (Lindholm-Dahlstrand 1997). Guided by these con-
siderations, we were able to identify 98 public research-
based spin-offs (PROs) and 37 corporate spin-offs (CSOs)
among our sample firms. Some 104 firms are located in
the USA, while the remaining firms are established in 11
EU countries, primarily in Sweden, Great Britain, and
Germany, as well as in Canada.
We collected data from a variety of sources. Alliance
records were compiled from the Recombinant Capital, a
healthcare data company, owned by Deloitte Consulting
and from the websites of the sample spin-offs. In the
present study, we consider all alliances that were
established between 1990 and 2003 and which include
licensing agreements, R&D contracts, R&D pacts, mi-
nority holdings, distribution or manufacturing agree-
ments, asset trading, joint ventures, and consortia. From
the two data sources, we were able to identify some
3048 alliances undertaken by the sample firms in the
period during which we calculate (lagged) alliance mea-
sures using a 3-year window. Alliances are differentiat-
ed into those between spin-offs and large firms (1284
alliances in total), those between spin-offs and SMEs
(1184 alliances in total), alliances between spin-offs and
PROs (524 in total), and alliances between spin-offs and
their parent firms (56 in total). We retrieved information
on patents to construct our measure of innovation per-
formance, from the Technology Profile Report main-
tained by the USPTO. Our measure is based on granted
patents, an indication of successful patent applications
that we subsequently assigned to a particular application
year. Data on firm-level variables, such as R&D expen-
ditures, and the number of employees of US firms were
obtained from SEC data at sec.gov., similar data for non-
US firms were obtained from annual reports and firm
websites.
3.3 Measures
Dependent variable We use an invention (patent) count
as our measure of spin-off’s innovation output. Insofar as
firms were engaged in a broad spectrum of research
activities, patent data include not only patents in Class
506 but also those related to technologies other than
combinatorial chemistry, as for example BClass 435^
(molecular biology and microbiology). Patents are typi-
cally regarded as among the most effective source of
information for research on innovation and have been
widely used as an indication of firm innovation
(Sampson 2007). One of their key advantages is reliabil-
ity and objectivity because new inventions are cross-
examined whether they satisfy criteria of novelty by
patent officers at the US Department of Commerce. The
caveats of using patent data as a proxy for innovativeness
are well known: not all innovations are patented, and
those that are do display a great deal of variability in
terms of value or importance (Pavitt 1985; Griliches
1990). The dependent variable is measured in year t + 1
with respect to the right-hand-side variables.
Focal independent variables Alliances are measured as
the number of alliances established by the firm in the
years t − 2 through t as constituting its alliance portfolio
(i.e., cumulative sum over 3 years prior to the measure-
ment of the dependent variable). Alliance data precede
patent data for two reasons. First, learning from alliance
partners is not automatic; it requires commitment, re-
sources, and, not least, time (Bierly and Chakrabarti
1996). Second, a gestation lag naturally separates the
start of an alliance and the output of innovative activity
(Stuart 2000). For the purpose of this study, a large firm
alliance is defined as an alliance with a partner firm of
more than 500 employees (more than twice the average
size of a spin-off) whereas an SME partner has fewer
than 500 employees.
Control variables We control for alliances that spin-off
firms formed with PROs and with their own parent
firms. These two variables are constructed in the similar
way as the focal variables. Research shows that alliances
between industry and universities intensified in the
1990s (e.g., Hall et al. 2003). Public science is attractive
for firms because it provides low-cost access to new
knowledge and recent scientific developments. Alli-
ances with parent firms may serve the purpose of
strengthening a newly established firm’s reputation
and the perceived quality of its technology and provide
a newly establish venture with resources.
The R&D expenditure (measured in log of US dollar
value) variable accounts for variation in inputs into the
innovation process (Griliches 1990). R&D activities are
expected to be a vital instrument in the innovation
process, and these activities are also expected to even-
tually be transformed into patents, certainly in a high-
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tech and patent-driven sector such combinatorial chem-
istry. In addition, higher levels of internal R&D activi-
ties of firms can also be seen as a signal of valuable
R&D capabilities to potential alliance partners.
Firm size (the logarithm of the number of firm em-
ployees) is a standard control variable in innovation studies
and refers to the classical Schumpeterian understanding of
the impact of firm size, through economies of scale and
scope, on innovative performance in general and patenting
activity, in particular (see also Belderbos et al. 2006).
We also control for the technological diversification
of spin-offs that can affect both innovation output and
alliance activities of firms due their technological flex-
ibility (Bierly and Chakrabarti 1996). Technological
diversification refers to the distribution of patents in a
firm’s patent portfolio over technology classes. Technol-
ogy class information comes from the patent classes into
which patents are assigned. To construct the diversifica-
tion measure, we distinguished between 243 unique 3-
digit patent classes. We use a standard Shannon-Wiener
diversity index to measure technological diversification,
i.e., Tx =∑ipi log 1/piwhere i stands for any patent class.
Obviously, a firm that has been granted patents in dif-
ferent patent classes will have a greater diversification
index than a firm with patents in a single patent class. In
addition, all models include unreported year dummies.
4 Results
Some descriptive statistics and correlations are presented
in Table 1. We have predominantly small firms in our
sample of spin-offs with a mean of about 180 employees.
Average alliance portfolio size is about seven alliances,
Table 1 Descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations
Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Patents 6.96 15.48 1.00
2. Firm size (log) 4.63 1.14 0.38 1.00
3. R&D expenditures 9.44 1.50 0.39 0.66 1.00
4. Technological diversification 0.58 0.58 0.32 0.41 0.42 1.00
5. Alliances with own parent firm 0.16 0.48 −0.07 −0.11 −0.12 −0.04 1.00
6. Alliances with PROs 1.07 1.69 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.12 0.23 1.00
7. Alliances with large firms 3.07 3.49 0.27 0.47 0.39 0.34 −0.01 0.14 1.00
8. Alliances with SMEs 2.87 3.66 0.32 0.42 0.36 0.24 0.01 0.17 0.65
Note. Correlations based on 929 observations for 125 firms. Correlations greater than 0.07 are statistically significant at an alpha level of
0.05, and correlations greater than |0.05| are statistically significant at an alpha level of 0.01
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Fig. 1 Spin-off alliance
formation with large and small-
and medium-sized firms by year
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based on a 3-year cumulative sum, including alliances
with PROs and parent firms. The latter two types are not
very frequent in our data, with sample average of 1.07
and 0.16, respectively. Pairwise correlations among the
variables used in the estimation are moderate in most
cases, with two exceptions. This includes the correlation
between firm size and R&D and between alliances with
large firms and SMEs. We show that any estimated effect
of these two alliance variables is not due to potential
(spurious) correlation, by also estimating models with
only one of these variables included. The mean variance
inflation factor (VIF) for the variables used in our models
is about 2.6, which is below the commonly used thresh-
old of 10 (Cohen et al. 2003).
From the early until late 1990s, we observe among
the sample firms a strong upward trend in the alliance
formation that flattens in 1998–1999 (see Fig. 1). This in
turn is followed by a strong recovery around the turn of
the century and a further dip after the technology crisis.
The upward trend is more pronounced among the PROs
than CSOs (see Fig. 2). Overall, these trends are consis-
tent with those documented in Roijakkers and
Hagedoorn (2006) and Schilling (2009).
The composition of these alliances is largely similar
in the two types of spin-offs, suggesting that variation of
innovation performance across spin-offs cannot be
linked, for instance, to variation in the number of
R&D contracts (see Fig. 3a, b).
In the estimation of our models, we seek to control
for unobserved heterogeneity and potential endogeneity
of the focal variables. Regarding the former, we argue
that a core part of unobserved firm heterogeneity will be
fixed, given the relatively short time span of our analy-
sis. A number of firm traits, such as their CSO or PRO
nature, founding team’s demographic traits, and the
nature of human capital, will not change or change little
over time. In our empirical models, we control for such
influences by including firm fixed effects.
A second potential source of endogeneity is the for-
mation of alliances (over time). Alliance formation may
be not be completely exogenous if this is driven by other
endogenous concerns such as the search for technolog-
ical variety or if alliance formation is dictated by the
relative ease or difficulty of attracting alliance partners.
The latter may play a role if the more successful firms in
terms of their patenting become systematically more
attractive as alliance partners.
We sought to address the above concerns by
conducting estimation of our model via instrumental
variables (IV) and fixed effects Poisson regression
methods.3 In the IV generalized method of moment
(GMM) approach, we instrument alliances with other
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Fig. 2 Spin-off alliance
formation by year and type of
spin-off firm
3 Estimation of our models with the fixed-effects Poisson regression
method implies that we cannot include any time-invariant variables,
such as a dummy for the background of the firm or personal charac-
teristics of the founder(s), in our models, since such a dummy always
takes the same value during the estimation period. In the random
effects specification of the Poisson model (not reported), we were able
to estimate the coefficient of the dummy for the background of the firm,
but we found that it is not statistically significant, implying that a spin-
off’s background does not directly determine our sample firm’s inno-
vation performance.
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firms, alliances with large firms and SMEs, with their
lagged values (measured in period t − 3 to t − 5), and a
dummy variable indicating whether the firm is vested in
the USA or in the EU.
We present this analysis of the relationship be-
tween alliances and the innovation performance of
spin-offs4 in Table 1 and the non-instrumented
versions of our fixed effects count models in the
Appendix Table 3. The GMM specification and the
non-IV models produce consistent results while the
Hansen test does not reject appropriateness of the
instruments.
Regarding the control variables, we find, not surpris-
ingly, that R&D expenditures have the expected positive
and significant effect on the innovation performance of
spin-offs in this industry. The effect of the technological
diversification of these spin-offs is significant in model I
and model III.
Model I confirms our baseline understanding of a pos-
itive association of the number of inter-firm alliances of
spin-offs and their innovation performance. In support of
hypothesis 1a, we find that alliances of spin-offs with large
4 From the original sample of 135 firms, nine firms report zero patents
during the estimation period and one firm has only one observation and
hence these firms are dropped from the Poisson fixed-effects regres-
sion. Four of these firms are CSOs and six are PROs.
57.86%27.43%
14.71%
R&D alliance Licensing alliance
Other type alliance
62.21%
25.06%
12.73%
R&D alliance Licensing alliance
Other type alliance
a
b
Fig. 3 a Distribution of R&D
alliances, licensing agreements,
and other types of alliances for
CSOs. b Distribution of R&D
alliances, licensing agreements,
and other types of alliances for
PROs
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firms have a positive impact on their innovation perfor-
mance and, in rejection of the alternative hypothesis 1b,
alliances with small firms have an insignificant impact on
their innovative performance (see Table 2, model II). The
difference between the two estimated coefficients is statis-
tically significant (χ2 (1) = 4.34, p value = 0.03). In support
of hypothesis 2, in terms of their innovation performance,
CSOs benefit more from alliances with other firms than
PROs (see Table 2, model III). The difference between the
two estimated coefficients is again statistically significant
(χ2 (1) = 12.84, p value = 0.00).
4.1 Supplementary analysis
In addition to testing the hypotheses and in further
consideration of the role of alliance partners of
different firm sizes, we also explored whether
spin-offs, in terms of either CSOs or PROs, benefit
Table 2 Alliances and the innovation performance of corporate and public research spin-offs
Variable Model I Model II Model III Model IV
Constant −4.195*** −5.625*** −4.241*** −5.406***
(0.504) (1.184) (0.522) (0.972)
Firm size −0.031 −0.231 0.009 0.026
(0.119) (0.402) (0.107) (0.137)
R&D 0.504*** 0.761*** 0.489*** 0.620***
(0.060) (0.210) (0.049) (0.081)
Technological diversification 0.446*** −0.217 0.565*** 0.127
(0.081) (0.482) (0.085) (0.286)
Alliances with own parent firm −0.031 0.161 0.020 0.165
(0.107) (0.162) (0.084) (0.119)
Alliances with PROs −0.073** −0.105 −0.098*** −0.118***
(0.035) (0.070) (0.031) (0.037)
Alliances with other firms 0.059***
(0.019)
Alliances with large firms 0.258**
(0.110)
Alliances with SMEs −0.071
(0.074)
Alliances of CSOs with other firms 0.059***
(0.016)
Alliances of PROs with other firms 0.025
(0.020)
Alliances of CSOs with large firms 0.093***
(0.034)
Alliances of PROs with large firms 0.187***
(0.062)
Alliances of CSOs with SMEs 0.048
(0.044)
Alliances of PROs with SMEs −0.153**
(0.078)
Hansen test, p (value) 2.248 (0.13) 1.451 (0.48) 2.481 (0.29) 1.490 (0.47)
Note: Results from fixed effects instrumental variable Poisson models. Robust (clustered) standard errors in parentheses. All models are
estimated on a sample of 929 observations for 125 firms and include 8 time dummies. The dependent variable is measured in year t + 1 with
respect to the right-hand side variables. The Hansen test statistic is the test of overidentifying restrictions
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
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more from having alliances with large firms or with
SMEs (see Table 2, model IV). In line with some
previous studies (Baum et al. 2000; Stuart 2000),
we find that both CSOs and PROs improve their
innovation performance if they cooperate with large
firms. The difference between the two estimated
coefficients is not statistically significant. Interest-
ingly, our findings also suggest that, in particular
for PROs, alliances with SMEs have a negative
impact on their innovation performance (see
Table 2, model IV).
The logic behind hypothesis 2 would suggest
that, contrary to CSOs, PROs may actually benefit
more from alliances with other PROs with which
they share a common background. We explored
this by estimating an additional regression (not
reported) in which we interacted PRO alliances
with the spin-off dummy. The PRO alliances of
PROs are indeed positive and significant in a
random effects Poisson model (and marginally in-
significant in the fixed effects model), while the
effect for CSOs is negative and marginally
significant.
4.2 Robustness checks
To test the robustness of our findings, we estimat-
ed a number of alternative specifications of our
model. We explored the models with an alternative
alliance variable, that is, calculated using a 5-year
window, to examine a potential influence of longer
lags on firm’s patent output. These results are
largely in line with those obtained from the report-
ed models using a 3-year window. One notable
exception is the coefficient on alliances by PROs,
which becomes marginally significant. However, in
line with hypothesis 2, the coefficient on this
variable is statistically significantly smaller than
that for the CSOs. This may suggest that the
positive innovation performance effects of inter-
firm alliances are slower to gestate among PROs
than among CSOs.
To test whether the underlying main effects of alli-
ance variables are non-linear, we considered models
with the square terms of the three alliance variables
included. However, none of these square terms are
statistically significant. Inclusion of the square terms
also makes the linear terms insignificant; hence, we
can rule out non-linearity.
5 Discussion and conclusions
As the combinatorial chemistry industry emerged
and reached its phase of early maturity, spin-offs
in this field were bracing for serious challenges
presented by a globalizing environment that is
characterized by a fast pace of technological
change (Malo and Geuna 2000). In order to sur-
vive in this environment, these firms needed to
initiate shrewd alliance strategies (Mohr et al.
2014). Interestingly, it seems that this is exactly
what spin-offs in the field of combinatorial chem-
istry did during the period 1990–2003. Specifical-
ly, as also demonstrated through Figs. 1 and 2,
their level of engagement in alliance activity
steadily increased during the larger part of that
early period. As reported in the above, this in-
crease in alliance formation in the early period of
the combinatorial chemistry industry is in line with
the general alliance formation trend across a wider
range of industries.
In the context of that general trend, there is an
established literature on the innovation performance
effects of alliances in high-tech industries and in
biotechnology industry in particular (e.g., Baum
et al. 2000; Kim 2012; Rothaermel and Deeds 2004;
Stuart 2000; Soh 2003; Sorrentino and Garaffo 2010.
In this paper, we contribute to this literature by ex-
amining the relative effectiveness of alliance strate-
gies for spin-offs—a specific type of young,
technology-based firms—in affecting their innova-
tion performance. We developed hypotheses that
aimed to examine how the innovation performance
of spin-off firms can benefit from inter-firm alliances
with different categories of firms such as large firms
or small- and medium-sized partners, a topic on
which extant literature is still rather contradictory.
We also contribute to the entrepreneurship literature
on spin-offs by examining the innovation perfor-
mance effects of alliances for both CSOs and PROs
as two major categories of spin-offs with disparate
corporate and public research backgrounds that we
expect to benefit differently from their inter-firm
alliances.
5.1 Key findings
Our analysis clearly demonstrates that spin-off
firms operating in a nascent industry, such as the
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combinatorial chemistry, can benefit from increas-
ing numbers of alliances that positively affect their
innovation performance. Given the relatively small
number of alliances in which these spin-offs en-
gage (see the descriptive statistics), the effect of
decreasing returns to larger alliance portfolios and
the effect of the relational mix of larger alliance
portfolios (Wassmer 2010) seem to be not that
relevant in the current context. In addition to such
a general finding, our study suggests a number of
more specific novel insights related to the prefer-
ence of spin-offs for particular partners and their
corporate or public research background. First,
during this early period of the combinatorial chem-
istry industry, inter-firm alliances with specific
partners, in terms of their firm size, benefitted
spin-offs in different ways. While alliances with
relatively large partners generated benefits in terms
of increased innovation performance, those with
SME partners did not. In line with previous re-
search, this finding suggests that spin-offs can
benefit from alliances with large firms that bring
superior alliance management capabilities to joint
projects (Rothaermel and Deeds 2006). These alli-
ances with large firms also increase spin-offs’ sta-
tus and reputation that make it easier for these
firms to attract other capable partners (Baum
et al. 2000; Stuart 2000; Dacin et al. 2007; Rao
et al. 2008).
Second, when looking at the background of spin-
offs, we see that during the emergence and early
growth of the combinatorial chemistry industry,
CSOs benefitted more from their inter-firm alliances
than PROs. While both types of firms, CSOs and
PROs, stand to gain from alliances with larger firms,
PROs seemed to lose when they ally with SMEs,
while such effect was neutral for CSOs. The greater
benefits from inter-firm alliances for CSOs, com-
pared to PROs, can be interpreted in light of the
corporate or public research backgrounds imprinted
in these spin-offs.
5.2 Implications
Our study contributes to spin-off and alliance re-
search by highlighting how crafty selection of appro-
priate alliance partners, depending on the focal firm’s
background can foster spin-off’s innovation. Specif-
ically, our findings suggest that alliances do not have
a unitary effect on innovation and that spin-off firms
are able to learn from their large partners and im-
prove their innovation performance, despite the ap-
propriation dangers that such asymmetric alliances
potentially hold. On the other hand, spin-offs find
fewer learning opportunities through alliances with
SMEs. These smaller partners have somewhat com-
parable capabilities and hence are less likely to offer
opportunities for advanced technology and product
development similar to those offered by larger
partners.
Our study contributes to the entrepreneurship lit-
erature in general by highlighting the importance of
the venture’s background. Previous studies on entre-
preneurship indicate that the founding team’s origins
affect firm success (e.g., Cooper 1971; Eisenhardt
and Schoonhoven 1990; Mangematin et al. 2003).
One conclusion from prior studies is that in the
context of PROs versus CSOs, there is evidence that
CSOs outperformed PROs in terms of return on
assets and productivity, in large part because CSOs’
founders had an advantage in using their prior ex-
perience, networks, and connections (e.g., Benghozi
and Salvador 2014; Zahra et al. 2007). Our study
demonstrates that similar advantages, in terms of
prior experience, networks, and connections, play a
role in creating greater innovation performance ben-
efits from a broad range of inter-firm alliances for
CSOs compared to PROs. During the nascent state
of the combinatorial chemistry industry, the
founding team members of CSOs were still connect-
ed to their corporate origins while PROs lacked
these advantages and had fewer options but to
search for alliances with more visible larger corpo-
rate partners.
5.3 Limitations and future research
Our study has a number of limitations, which at the
same time suggest avenues for future research. First,
our sample of a single industry could limit the gen-
eralizability of our findings. The role of different
types of alliances for young, innovative spin-offs in
different industrial settings is worth further investi-
gation in light of renewed academic and policy inter-
est for such firms (see Schneider and Veugelers
2010).
Second, our empirical setting largely covers the
emergence and gradual maturing of the combinatorial
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chemistry industry, a period characterized by high
growth and high alliance activity of spin-offs. Further
research could determine whether alliances continue to
play a significant (positive) role as an industry further
matures.
Third, as is the case with most innovation stud-
ies, we cannot fully exclude the possibility of
reverse causality. Interestingly, a number of studies
have examined a reverse relationship, i.e., the im-
pact of firm’s innovation on its alliance formation.
For example, Ahuja (2000) concludes that innova-
tiveness has a significant positive effect on alliance
formation in the chemicals industry. Stuart (2000)
and Podolny et al. (1996) report similar findings in
the semiconductor industry. The logic behind this
relationship, using Ahuja’s (2000) terminology, is
that a firm’s propensity to form alliances is deter-
mined by both Binducements^ and Bopportunities.^
Innovative firms may have greater opportunities to
engage in alliances, because these firms are more
attractive partners for joint technology develop-
ment. On the other hand, high levels of technical
and commercial expertise will reduce firms’ in-
ducement to engage in alliances. As firms engage
in alliances, successful innovative firms face a
danger of involuntary dissipation of their knowl-
edge to potential competitors, which can lead to
weakening of their competitive advantage. Our
research suggests that for resource inhibited spin-
offs, it is primarily positive inducements that play
an important role, thus mitigating the reverse cau-
sality logic. In addition, in an attempt to further
minimize this possibility in the current analysis,
we estimated our models with the instrumental
variable method.
Fourth, our analysis took into account the tech-
nological diversity of the firms in a broad sense,
ignoring possible technological relatedness between
dyads in a focal firm’s alliances (Sampson 2007).
Further insights into an optimal alliance portfolio
will require taking into account additional charac-
teristics of alliance partners such as their knowl-
edge base and the intensity of the collaboration.
The inter-play between the characteristics of the
firm, such as its exploration or exploitation orien-
tation, the characteristics of its alliance partners,
the strategic fit of partners, and the impact of host
countries, could refine the model. Our analysis is
largely macroscopic and could neither include po-
tential organizational moderators nor assess the
effect of the composition of the founding team
on the effects of alliances on innovation perfor-
mance. In our analysis, we attempt to mitigate this
via fixed effects to control for team and firm-
related time invariant unobservable characteristics
and we encourage future research to further ex-
plore the microfoundations of spin-offs’ network-
ing strategies.
Finally, our paper assumes that PROs as a whole
are somehow homogenous in their start up experi-
ence (or lack thereof) and management team com-
position. As pointed out by Mosey et al. (2006),
Mosey and Wright (2007), and Scholten et al.
(2015), academic entrepreneurs acquainted with
business activities possess wider social capital that
enables them to be more effective in developing
inter-firm alliances than academic entrepreneurs
with little or no prior business experience. Similarly,
research by Visintin and Pittino (2014) indicates
that, under certain conditions, the economic perfor-
mance of PROs improves with increased heteroge-
neity in terms of a mix of academic and non-
academic founders. Given the limitations in the cur-
rent data, future research, based on extended
datasets, is encouraged to take a more detailed look
at the implications the internal heterogeneity of spin-
offs in terms of experience and management team
composition on innovation performance.
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Appendix
Table 3 Alliances and the innovation performance, as well as fixed effects Poisson without instrumental variables
Variable Model I Model II Model III Model IV
Firm size 0.101 0.033 0.097 0.025
(0.204) (0.167) (0.202) (0.177)
R&D 0.225** 0.252** 0.236** 0.256**
(0.108) (0.109) (0.104) (0.112)
Technological diversification 0.198 0.216* 0.210* 0.222*
(0.123) (0.128) (0.120) (0.127)
Alliances with own parent firm −0.002 0.017 0.008 0.015
(0.119) (0.113) (0.115) (0.112)
Alliances with PROs −0.044 −0.026 −0.048 −0.024
(0.041) (0.022) (0.041) (0.027)
Alliances with other firms 0.026***
(0.009)
Alliances with large firms 0.081***
(0.016)
Alliances with SMEs −0.035**
(0.014)
Alliances of CSOs with other firms 0.031***
(0.008)
Alliances of PROs with other firms 0.021
(0.015)
Alliances of CSOs with large firms 0.085***
(0.018)
Alliances of PROs with large firms 0.074**
(0.030)
Alliances of CSOs with SMEs −0.039
(0.027)
Alliances of PROs with SMEs −0.031*
(0.019)
Log-likelihood −2665.13 −2570.98 −2663.13 −2570.42
χ2 test of improved model fit 188.29*** 3.99** 185.43***
Note: Results from fixed effects Poisson models. Robust (clustered) standard errors in parentheses. All models are estimated on a sample of
929 observations for 125 firms and include 8 time dummies. The dependent variable is measured in year t + 1 with respect to the right-hand
side variables. The χ2 test statistic is the likelihood ratio test comparing the focal model with the more parsimonious model
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
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